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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kirk Loftis appeals from the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion, 
contending his felony sentence is illegal because the charging document was 
only sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a misdemeanor. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On November 26, 2003, the state filed an Information charging Loftis with 
"DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, FELONY, I.C. § 
18-903, 918(7)(b)." (#31003 R.1, p.21 (capitalization original).) The Information 
further alleged: 
That the Defendant, KIRK A. LOFTIS, on or about the 1st day 
of October, 2003, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did actually, 
intentionally and unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the 
person of Kim Richards, to-wit: by punching the victim in the face 
and head, pulling her by the hair and strangling her by the neck, 
while in the presence of a child, to-wit: four (4) years 
old, and where Kim Richards and the Defendant are household 
members. 
(#31003 R., pp.21-22 (capitalization original).) 
Loftis proceeded to trial and was found guilty of "domestic violence in the 
presence of a child, as charged." (#31003 R., p.53 (emphasis omitted).) On 
October 14, 2004, the court entered judgment and imposed a unified twenty-year 
sentence with ten years fixed. (#31003 R., pp.79-81.) Loftis also filed a Rule 35 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order Taking Judicial Notice "of the 
Clerks' Record and Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 31003, State v. 
Loftis." (Order Taking Judicial Notice, dated May 2, 2012.) In his opening brief, 
Loftis erroneously states that the Court took judicial notice of Docket No. 31102. 
(Opening Brief of Appellant, p.1 n.1.) 
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motion requesting a reduction of his sentence, which the court denied. See State 
v. Loftis, Docket No. 31003, 2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 349 at pp.1, 11-12 
(Idaho App. Feb. 9, 2007). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Loftis' conviction 
and sentence. Loftis, supra. 
On December 19, 2011, more than seven years after judgment was 
entered, Loftis filed a second Rule 35 motion, and a supporting brief, claiming his 
sentence is illegal. (R., pp.7-13.) In his supporting memorandum, Lofits argued: 
Domestic VIOLENCE is not a crime upon which the defendant 
could be legally sentenced (as opposed to Domestic BATTERY). 
Domestic Violence is a statute designed to enhance an underlying 
criminal act. While the Defendant may have [legally] been 
sentenced for the crime of BATTERY (§18-903), or arguably to 
Domestic Battery (§18-918(3)(b)), Defendant was not charged nor 
convicted of Domestic Battery, thus, the maximum term to which 
this Court could legally sentence the defendant was (up to) six (6) 
months subject to any enhancement pursuant to LC. §18-918(7)(b). 
(R., pp.10-11 (emphasis, capitalization, and bracketed language original, 
footnote omitted).) 
The state filed a response to Loftis' motion, asserting (1) Loftis' "sentence 
is within the statutory parameters and is not illegal," and (2) the motion is 
"untimely" to the extent Loftis was complaining about the jury instructions. (R., 
pp.14-15.) 
The district court denied Loftis' motion, stating: 
On July 7, 2004, Mr. Loftis was convicted of Domestic 
Violence in the Presence of a Child, Felony (I.C. §§ 18-908, 18-
918). The Court notes that the title of section 18-918, Idaho Code, 
is "Domestic Violence." The Court subsequently sentenced Mr. 
Loftis to ten (10) years' [sic] fixed incarceration followed by ten (10) 
years' [sic] indeterminate. The maximum sentence for committing 
Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child is twenty (20) years. 
I.C. § 18-918(2), (4). Thus, Mr. Loftis's twenty-year sentence is 
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fixed within the limits of the statute, and the sentence does not 
need to be corrected. 
To the extent that Mr. Loftis challenging [sic] his conviction 
on the basis that it was improperly titled, his argument is frivolous. 
Section 18-918 is clearly titled "Domestic Violence." To the extent 
that Mr. Loftis is challenging the constitutionality of his conviction, 
his arguments are untimely. 
(R., p.16.) 
Loftis filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.18-20.) 
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ISSUES 
Loftis states the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Did the court have subject-matter jurisdiction to impose 
judgment for a felony? 
2. Was the twenty-year sentence imposed illegal due to lack of 
jurisdiction when the charging document can only be 
construed as charging a misdemeanor? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as follows: 
Has Loftis failed to show error in the denial of his Rule 35 motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Loftis Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Loftis asserts he should have been granted Rule 35 relief because, he 
argues, the sentence imposed upon his conviction for felony domestic violence 
was illegal due to a lack of jurisdiction over a felony offense. (Opening Brief of 
Appellant, pp.7-10.) Loftis' claim fails because it is nothing more than an 
untimely due process argument relabeled as a jurisdictional claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Jurisdiction is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. State v. Kavaiecz, 139 Idaho 482,483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). The 
legality of a sentence is also a question of law subject to free review. State v. 
Morris, 131 Idaho 263,264, 954 P.2d 681,682 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. The State's Charging Document Was Sufficient To Confer Jurisdiction 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general 
type or class of dispute." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255, 
1258 (2011) (quoting Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 
(2007)). "The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was 
committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the 
court." Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d at 1258 (quoting State v. Rogers, 140 
Idaho 23, 28, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004)). The Information filed in Loftis' 
underlying criminal case satisfied the jurisdictional requirements in that it alleged 
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an offense committed in the State of Idaho. That Loftis believes it only alleged a 
misdemeanor versus a felony does not present a jurisdictional question because 
the court would still have jurisdiction even if, as Loftis contends, the charging 
document only alleged a misdemeanor. Loftis' assertion that the Information was 
only sufficient for purposes of charging a misdemeanor is more accurately 
characterized as a due process argument, which is clearly untimely and not 
within the purview of Rule 35. State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536, 148 P.3d 
1278, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 760, 101 P.3d 
699, 704 (2004)) ("pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b)(2), due process objections to a 
charging document are waived unless raised before trial"); Housley v. State, 119 
Idaho 885, 889, 811 P.2d 495, 499 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The Rule 35 motion serves 
a narrower purpose. It subjects only the sentence to reexamination."). Because 
Loftis' claim that his sentence is illegal is predicated on his erroneous assertion 
that the court lacked jurisdiction, it also fails. 
Even if this Court considers whether the language in the Information was 
sufficient to charge a felony offense, Loftis has failed to establish it was not. 
Loftis claims the Information was jurisdictionally defective for purposes of 
charging a felony because it did not reference subsection (3) of I.C. § 18-918 and 
did not include the word "willfully" as used in that subsection. (Opening Brief of 
Appellant, pp.7-8.) To the contrary, despite these omissions, the only reasonable 
construction of the Information is that it charged Loftis with felony domestic 
violence in the presence of a child. Although the Information does not cite 
subsection (3) of I.C. § 18-918, it includes the "traumatic injury" language of I.C. 
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§ 18-918(3) and expressly cites subsection (7)(b) of that same statute, which 
pertains to the enhancement for committing domestic violence in the presence of 
a child, and specifically alleges facts in support of the enhancement. Obviously 
the state could not invoke subsection (7)(b) if it were not alleging an offense 
prohibited by I.C. § 18-918(3). It cannot reasonably be said that the absence of a 
reference to subsection (3) of I.C. § 18-918 resulted in the failure to charge Loftis 
with a felony, and it certainly cannot be said that the failure to cite that specific 
subsection deprived the court of jurisdiction. 
Loftis' argument that the absence of the word "willfully" in the Information 
deprived the court of jurisdiction also fails. The Court of Appeals addressed a 
similar issue in State v. Sohm and concluded otherwise. 140 Idaho 458, 95 P.3d 
76 (Ct. App. 2004). Loftis acknowledges the holding in Sohm but contends the 
"reasoning in that case ... is unsound and should not be followed." (Opening 
Brief of Appellant, p.9.) 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of 
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); 
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)); 
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) 
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong 
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or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 
384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question, 
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the 
Court is] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as 
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825 
P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring). 
In Sohm, the defendant was charged as follows: 
BUDDY SOHM is accused by this information of the crime 
of: DOMESTIC BATTERY, Idaho Code§ 18-918(3), committed as 
follows, to wit: 
That the said BUDDY SOHM, in POCATELLO, in the County 
of Bannock, State of Idaho, on or about the 11th DAY OF May, 
2002, did inflict a traumatic injury upon another household member, 
VICKI HEGG, by striking her in the face and body resulting in 
traumatic injury. 
Sohm, 140 Idaho at 459, 95 P.3d at 77 (capitalization original). 
After he was found guilty, Sohm claimed the information failed to confer 
jurisdiction on the district court because it "did not allege that he 'willfully' inflicted 
the traumatic injury on his victim." Id. The Court reviewed the claim under the 
following legal standard: 
Where the alleged deficiency is not asserted until after the verdict, 
the information will be liberally construed in favor of validity and will 
be upheld unless it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, 
charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted. The 
reviewing court has considerable leeway in construing the 
information to imply the necessary allegations from the language of 
the information. 
Sohm, 140 Idaho at 459, 95 P.3d at 77 (quotations and citations omitted). Using 
this standard the Court concluded "the language of the information alleging that 
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Sohm struck Hegg in the face and body resulting in traumatic injury, when 
liberally construed adequately alleges the elements of the crime for which Sohm 
was convicted" because the "information reasonably implies the 'willful' or 
'intentional' element of I.C. § 18-918(3) by use of the word 'striking,' and by its 
description of Hegg sustaining those strikes on her face and body." Id. 
(emphasis original). The Court reasoned that the word "strike," when considered 
in context and given its "most commonly understood meaning," meant 
"intentional rather than accidental." ~ at 459-60, 95 P.3d at 77-78. The Court 
further reasoned that the term "strike" was used to describe "repeated blows" as 
evidenced by reference to the "face and body," which "underscores the 
implication that an intent to cause traumatic injury informed Sohm's actions." ~ 
at 460, 95 P.3d at 78 (emphasis original). "Thus," the Court held, "the 
information was sufficient to charge Sohm with the crime of felony domestic 
violence and to vest the district court with jurisdiction to try the case." ~ 
Loftis argues that "[t]he first problem with Sohm is that it found the use of 
the word 'striking' in the charge raised 'the clear inference of repeated blows,"' 
which he contends "is not the case," because "even a liberal reading of 'striking 
her in the head and body' connotes two, not multiple, blows." (Opening Brief of 
Appellant, p.9 (quoting Sohm, supra).) Loftis then argues the Court of Appeals 
"compounds its error by concluding ... 'that an intent to cause traumatic injury 
informed Sohm's actions'" because, he asserts, "a person could strike someone 
repeatedly without having the specific intent to cause any injury, much less a 
traumatic injury." (Id.) 
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While Loftis quibbles with the Court's application of the legal standard to 
the charging document at issue in Sohm, he does not appear to dispute the legal 
standard itself, i.e., that the "information will be liberally construed in favor of 
validity and will be upheld unless it does not, by any fair or reasonable 
construction, charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted." As such, 
he has failed to establish any basis for disregarding the standards set forth in 
Sohm. Moreover, Loftis has failed to explain why the language "intentionally and 
unlawfully commit a traumatic injury" used in the Information in his case does not 
distinguish it from Sohm in a manner sufficient to resolve his concern that the 
charging document in Sohm did not allege any intent. (Opening Brief of 
Appellant, p.9.) 
If anything, the Court in this case need not follow Sohm because although 
the Court in Sohm analyzed the adequacy of the language of the information for 
purposes of determining whether it conferred jurisdiction, since Sohm the Court 
has recognized that past precedents did not always recognize that there is a 
"clear[ ] differentiat[ion] between due process and jurisdictional queries" and 
specifically cited Sohm as one such example. Murray, 143 Idaho at 535, 148 
P.3d at 1281. The Court in Murray noted the Supreme Court's opinion in Jones, 
supra, which clarified the distinction and held "the liberal standard that applies to 
an untimely jurisdictional challenge is satisfied if the charging document merely 
cites the Idaho Code section under which the defendant is charged." l!;l at 536, 
148 P.3d at 1282. Thus, in Sohm, the jurisdictional issue could have been 
resolved based on the fact that the information cited an Idaho Code section, just 
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as the issue can be resolved in this case. Even if the Court concludes more is 
required in this case in order to confer jurisdiction over a felony since the 
Information does not cite I.C. § 18-918(3), for the reasons set forth above, the 
language used in the Information was sufficient to do so. 
Because the Information was adequate to confer jurisdiction in Loftis' case 
(even accepting Loftis' felony-misdemeanor distinction), Loftis has failed to 
demonstrate error in the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Lute's Rule 35 motion. 
DATED this 2yth day of December 2012 . 
• JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Dep~ Attorney General 
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